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Abstract. The rapid growth of WiFi over the past two years reveals the willingness of the
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) to develop this technology and the interest
of the users in this new service. However, the lack of unified roaming slows down the
deployment of this kind of networks. In this paper, we present a simple solution that allows
a mobile node to connect to a hot spot managed by a WISP in a secure way while preserving
its anonymity. We use a reputation-based system to discourage the WISPs from providing
a bad quality of service to the mobile nodes. We will show that all the parties are motivated
to behave correctly, that our solution thwarts rational attacks, that it is possible to detect
malicious attacks and, in some case, identify the attackers.
1 Introduction and problem statement
Wi-Fi networks have a very strong potentiel: They are easy to deploy, they use free spectrum frequencies
and they allow the users to have an Internet connection that is several times faster that any cable modem
connection. Furthermore, the equipment is inexpensive (typically $100 for an access point and less than
$50 for a receiver) and the use of the network is very simple (typically plug and play).
Thousands of hot-spots are already deployed in cafes, hotels and airports to attract business travellers
and Internet addicts; more and more companies are entering the business (e.g., start-ups like Boingo
Wireless[1], Wayport[2], . . . or well-established companies like T-Mobile[3]).
However, the lack of interoperability between Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) is an
obstacle to the deployment and success of WiFi networks3: A client that has an account with a provider
A cannot connect to a hot spot managed by a provider B. This situation is prejudicial to the clients
and to the future of WiFi because it particularly discourages small WISPs (i.e., with few hot spots)
from entering the business and allows large WiFi companies to monopolize the market and bias the
competition.
The goal of the work presented in this paper is to present a simple solution that (i) encourages
network usage by mobile nodes; (ii) encourages good quality of service (QoS) provision; (iii) encourages
further network deployment; and (iv) minimizes (human) user involvement4.
In our solution, we use a reputation mechanism to discourage the WISPs from providing a bad QoS
to the mobile nodes. We also use a micropayment scheme to make sure that the mobile nodes pay
for the service they received. We can easily show that our solution motivates all the parties to behave
correctly (i.e., according to the set of protocols). This work was carried out in the framework of the
MISC/Termindes research program [4].
?? The work presented in this paper was supported (in part) by the National Competence Center in Research on Mobile
Information and Communication Systems (NCCR-MICS), a center supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation
under grant number 5005− 67322
3 Details about the roaming problem are in Section 2
4 This involvement should be limited to setting up a few parameters at initialization of the device. Furthermore, roaming
should be seamless.
2 State of the art
Reputation-based systems: Also called feedback or recommandation mechanisms [5], they are mainly
used to build trust and foster cooperation among a given community. The efficiency of reputation
mechanisms have been widely studied in various fields and with different approaches. Studies such as
[6–8] consider the effect of online reputation systems [9] on e-marketing and trading communities like
e-Bay. Reputation mechanisms are also used to foster cooperation in peer-to-peer networks [10] or in
ad hoc networks [11, 12].
But, from all these studies, we cannot draw a clear conclusion about the efficiency of reputation
systems; each of these mechanisms should thus be analyzed on a per-case basis.
Roaming in WISPs: The deployment and success of WiFi networks is slowed down by the lack of
interoperability between WiFi providers (also called fragmentation problem [13]): A client that has an
account with a WISP A cannot connect to a hotspot managed by a WISP B. However, the situation
is changing and more and more WISPs are establishing roaming agreements (similar to what is done
for GSM). The roaming can be between providers within the same country (e.g., SFR, Orange and
Bouygue in France) or international (e.g., between the British BT and the American Airpath).
Another solution would be to use the service of a WiFi roaming operator like Boingo Wireless [1].
Such an operator tries to solve the roaming problem by having agreements with as many WISPs as
possible. Then it aggregates all the hot spots managed by these WISPs into a single (seamless) network.
However, the problem remains the same if a Boingo client tries to connect to a hot spot managed by
a WISP that has no agreement with Boingo Wireless: This solution thus attenuates the effect of the
fragmentation problem but do not solve it.
In [14], Patel and Crowcroft propose a ticket based system that allows mobile users to connect to
foreign service providers: The user contacts a ticket server to acquire a ticket, requests a service from
a service server and uses the ticket to pay for that service. However, unlike the solution we present in
this paper, the authors do not question the honesty of the service providers i.e., they assume that the
service providers provide the users with a good quality of service, which is far from been guaranteed
in WiFi networks.
3 System model
In this paper, we consider a mobile node MN that is affiliated with a home network H and that wants
to connect to the Internet via a hot spot managed by a wireless Internet service provider W . MN has
an account with H, shares a secret key kHM with it and fully trusts it for manipulating its account. H
also shares a secret key kHW with W .
We assume that all the messages exchanged betweenMN and H go throughW and that the backbone
is a commodity; the rewarding of the backbone operator would follow already established practices and
techniques, and is not addressed in this paper (a flat rate subscription, probably).
In this paper, we present a reputation based mechanism that encourages the WISPs to behave cor-
rectly (i.e., to provide the MN s with a good QoS). The reputation mechanism is maintained by a trusted
central authority we denote by TCA5. The details about the reputation system are in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Adversarial model
In this paper, we assume that:
– H and TCA are trusted by the other parties for all the actions they perform6.
– W is rational and therefore it cheats if there is some gain from misbehaving.
– MN may be malicious and therefore it can cheat even if there is no gain from misbehaving. This
implicitly assumes that MN can also perform rational attacks.
Confidentiality of data is not an issue in our case, so we do not consider passive attacks where the
attacker eavesdrops the data exchanges between two parties. Note that this is an orthogonal issue that
is easily addressed using standard techniques.
5 In a “grassroots” vision, the TCA would be a federation of WISPs, who join forces to centralize a few strategic functions.
In a more conventional vision, the TCA can be under the control of a world-wide organization much as a quality control
company (e.g., SGS), a certification company, or a global telecommunications operator.
6 Even if H is itself a WISP, it only plays the role of a home network in our model.
We exclusively consider attacks performed against the different phases of our protocols, meaning
that we do not consider other arbitrary attacks like DoS attacks based on jamming for example. Several
attackers can collude and share information to perform more sophisticated attacks.
In this paper, we want to study the effect of rational and malicious attacks on our set of protocols.
Our goal is to make sure that the set of protocols we propose thwarts rational attacks (i.e., an attacker
gains nothing from cheating), detects malicious attacks and, if possible, identifies the attacker.
3.2 Reputation model
The behavior of each WISP in our model is characterized by what we call a reputation record. This record
represents an evaluation of the reputation of the WISP and is generated and signed by TCA. When a
WISP first enters the network, TCA provides it with an initial reputation record that can afterwards
increase (i.e., better reputation) or decrease, depending on the behavior of the WISPs.
If MN has two neighboring WISPs that propose equivalents offers, i.e., same QoS and price (see
Subsection 4.2), MN will choose to connect to the access point managed by the WISP that has the best
reputation record.
4 Proposed solution
4.1 Notation
In this paper, we call Session the period during which the WISP provides the service andMN pays for it.
A session is subdivided into periods7. We also call Reputation update time the point in time at which TCA
stops receiving reputation information from the Hs (see Subsection 3.2), updates the reputation records
and informs the WISPs about their new records. The new records are valid until the next reputation
update time.
4.2 Rationale of the solution
In this Subsection, we present the details of our solution (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The proposed solution. The mobile node MN wants to connect to the internet via a hot spot managed
by the WISP W . H is a home network with whom MN is affiliated. The trusted certification authority TCA is
in charge of maintaining the reputations of the WISPs.
Selection and authentication of the WISP: MN scans the spectrum and identifies the different
WISPs available in the neighborhood. Each WISP generates an offer containing (at least) its current
reputation record, the quality of service (QoS) it proposes (e.g., expressed in Mb/s), the price it asks for,
its public key and the corresponding certificate. The WISP signs the offer and sends the offer and the
signature to MN.
Then MN collects this information and determines the WISP that proposed the best offer. The
decision making should be done by a software agent at the mobile node to automate the process and
7 This implicitly implies that the payment frequency depends on time, but it can depend also on the amount of information
exchanged between MN and W .
avoid human involvement except if necessary (e.g., setting up parameters like the maximum price MN is
willing to pay for the service, the minimum QoS it would accept, . . . ). This choice should also depend on
the application MN wants to run (e.g., if MN wants to chat, it will probably choose the WISP offering
the lowest price, whereas it would choose the offer with the best reputation record and QoS for an online
payment application). More sophisticated schemes (e.g., auctionning) can be envisioned to select the
WISP.
Then, MN verifies the certificate of the WISP that proposed the best offer. If the verification is
incorrect, MN checks the second best offer and so on. We call W the so chosen WISP.
Authentication of MN : Before beginning the service provision, W has to make sure that MN is a
valid mobile node that is registered with a valid and well-established home network H. As we want to
preserve the anonymity of MN, the verification of the identity of MN will be done by H.
We use in this paper the following authentication mechanism that is commonly used in industry
(e.g., SecurID [15]): When a mobile node MN registers with a home network H, the two parties share a
random seed s that represents the input to a pseudorandom generator. The output is a random number
tag that is 30 to 50 bits long. H keeps a small window (e.g., 50 entries) of upcoming tags for each mobile
node. H maintains the couples (tag; node’s identity) in a sorted database.
Upon reception of a given tag,H searches its database, retrieves the couple (tag;identity) and identifies
MN. In case of collision (i.e., more than one couple contains the random number tag), H asks MN to
send the next tag value.
H can then identify MN and respond positively to the identification request of W . By doing so, H
takes the responsibility of what MN will do during the session. In case of problems, H can retrieve the
identity of the user and, if needed, sue him.
Initializing the payment system: The credit-based micro-payment scheme we use in this paper is
highly inspired from the PayWord scheme [16]: During the session setup, H generates a fresh chain
of paywords w1, w2 , ..., wn by choosing wn at random and by computing wi = h(wi+1) for i =
n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 0, where h is a one-way hash function and n is the maximum number of payments that
MN can send to WISP during the session. The root w0 of the payword chain is not considered to be a
payword itself.
Then,H generates a commitment to this payword chain, which contains (at least) w0 and wn, encrypts
it using the key kHM it shares with MN, and sends it to MN. MN can then regenerate the payword chain
and use it during the session (see Subsection 4.2). H also encrypts w0 using the key kHW it shares with
W , and sends it to W .
Service provision and payment: First of all, MN and W agree on a symmetric session key kMW .
They will use that key to secure all the messages they exchange during the session (e.g., compute a MAC
on these messages).
The session is subdivided into periods. During the t-th period, MN sends to WISP the t-th PayWord
wt encrypted with the symmetric key kMW . wt represents the t-th payment and WISP can verify its
the validity by checking that h(wt) = wt−1, where h is the one-way hash function used by H to generate
the chain. If the verification of the payment is correct, W provides MN with the t-th part of the service.
In our protocols, we use a payword system to allow the off-line verification of the payments by WISP.
The paywords are payment authorizations that W will later send8 to H to get paid for the service it
provided. If MN stops sending the payment authorizations, W will also stop the service provision and
the session is ended. If there is a packet loss the payment or the service is just resent.
Sending the payment request: At the end of the session, W sends to H the latest hash value w` it
received from MN and the number ` of provided services.
Then, H verifies the validity9 of w`, rewards W for the ` parts of the service, and charges MN for
them.
8 In the PayWord scheme, only the latest payword is sent to H. Details are in Subsection 4.2
9 This verification can be optimized by using techniques like [17]
Sending the satisfaction level to H: At the end of the session, MN sends10 to H (via W ) a report
on its satisfaction level. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this report is a binary variable that
corresponds to 1 if the QoS received from W corresponds to what MN and W agreed on, and to 0
otherwise. The absence of feedback counts as bad feedback: Since H knows that a session was started
(due to the account verification) it would know if the feedback is missing. This is to avoid that W drops
a feedback it suspects would not benefit its reputation.
When H receives the satisfaction level, it refunds MN a small amount ε. The reward ε is meant to
encourage the mobile nodes to report their satisfaction levels: It covers the cost c of sending the report
(ε > c).
Aggregation and sending of the feedback to TCA: H aggregates all the satisfaction levels of
the MN s affiliated with it by generating, for each WISP, a couple (g, b) where g is the number of good
feedbacks and b is the number of bad feedbacks. H sends this information to TCA (e.g., right before the
reputation update time) and resets its counters.
Updating the reputation record: TCA collects the information about the satisfaction levels from the
Hs. Then, at reputation update time, TCA processes this information, updates and signs the reputation
record of each WISP and informs the WISPs about their new records.
4.3 Design model
During these different phases, we use symmetric key and public key cryptography primitives to secure
the message exchange and to correctly authenticate the different parties involved in the communication.
We minimize however the use of public key cryptography to reduce the computation cost of our solution.
Hence, public key operations are used (by MN and the neighboring WISPs) only during the verifica-
tion the identity of the selected WISP (see Subsection 4.2).
Symmetric key primitives are used for all the message exchanges in our solution. Indeed, when two
interacting parties need to verify the integrity of the data they exchange, they use a Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC). They use symmetric key encryption and decryption operations when they need to
preserve the confidentiality of the messages, e.g., the data sent by MN to H during the verification of
the identity of the mobile node (see Subsection 4.2).
5 Assessment
5.1 Reputation system
In our solution, the different players are motivated to participate in the reputation mechanisms. Indeed:
– W is motivated to provideMN with a good QoS because otherwise the feedback ofMN will be negative
(see the analysis of the Selective misbehavior attack in Subsection 5.3).
– MN is motivated to report on its interaction with W because it receives a refund ε.
– W is motivated to forward the report (see the analysis of the Report dropping attack in Subsection 5.3).
All the entities involved in the maintenance of the reputation system are therefore motivated to
behave correctly (i.e., according to the proposed solution).
5.2 Attacks
In this Subsection, we present some attacks that an attacker may want to perform against our solution:
– Selective misbehavior attack: W misbehaves (i.e., W intentionally provides a bad QoS) with a specific
mobile node to whom it is supposed to provide the service.
– Denigration attack: MN receives a good QoS from W but pretends the contrary by sending a negative
report on the satisfaction level or by not sending the report at all. A more sophisticated attack would
be for several mobile nodes to collude and perform this attack.
– Report dropping attack: MN sends the report but W does not transmit it to H.
– Denial of service attack: W receives the t-th payment from MN but refuses to provide the correspond-
ing service.
– Refusal to pay attack: MN does not send the t-th payment to W .
10 If MN moves, the report is sent via another WISP.
5.3 Security analysis
In this Subsection, we analyse the robustness of our solution against the attacks listed in Subsection 5.2.
We show that none of these attacks is rational, that we can detect malicious attacks and that it is
possible, in some cases, to identify the attackers.
Selective misbehavior attack: If W misbehaves with a given MN it provides service to, MN will
send a negative report to its home network H and H will inform TCA about this feedback.
If this attack is repeated, the cumulation of the negative reports will affect the future reputation
records of W . If on the contrary, this attack is performed rarely, it will not affect much the reputation of
W but W will still gain nothing from performing this attack; as W is rational, it will not perform this
attack.
Denigration attack: If MN does not send the report on the satisfaction level, H will not give it the
ε reward and will consider the absence of feedback as negative feedback. Therefore, this attack is not
rational for MN.
So it is more interesting for MN to send a negative feedback instead of not sending the report at all:
The effect of the attack is the same and at least MN will get paid for the sending. But this attack is still
not rational. Indeed, MN gains nothing from sending a negative feedback instead of a positive one (the
cost of the sending remains the same). Such behavior is thus purely malicious.
H can statistically detect this attack. Indeed, H keeps track of all that is happening between the
nodes affiliated with it and the different WISPs. It will then consider MN as a misbehaving node if the
following events happen frequently11:
– MN always pretends that it received a bad QoS from a given WISP, whereas many other MNs report
on a good QoS on that very WISP (as the selective misbehavior attack is not possible, this situation
is suspect), or
– H never receives reports from MN about the sessions it established with W , or
– MN pretends that the QoS was bad but at the same time the duration of the session and the amount
of data exchanged prove that the QoS was good.
If several MNs collude and perform this attack, H is still able to identify them as long as the number
of colluders does not represent an important fraction of the nodes interacting with W .
Please note that this colluding attack comes with an important cost: if an attacker A wants to alter
the reputation of W by parking misbehaving nodes close to the hot spots managed by W , A should
own many devices and for each of them, it should register with a valid home network H (and pay a
registration fee). Note also that this colluding attack may harm very small WISPs (with few number of
hot spots) - if the attacker pays the price - but it is much too costly against WISPs with hundreds or
thousands hot spots.
Report dropping attack: If W expects a negative feedback, it may want to drop the report on the
satisfaction level instead of transmitting it to H. But as the absence of feedback counts as negative
feedback, this dropping does not help W . Furthermore, the report may be positive, in which case W
would lose a good feedback. This attack is therefore not rational for W .
Denial of service attack: If W refuses to provide the t-th service, MN will keep asking for it (by
sending again the t-th payment). After a predefined number of retransmission requests, MN will end the
session, which prevents W from providing more services and thus earning more money.
In order to prevent W from receiving the payment for the t-th service (which it did not provide), we
can use the payment system presented in [18].
Refusal to pay attack: If MN does not send the t-th payment, W will not provide the t-th service
and the session will end (after a predefined number of retransmission requests). This attack is then not
rational: It prevents MN from receiving the service but does not harm W .
11 The higher the number of events is, the more accurate the detection is.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we present a simple solution that encourages the use and the deployment of WiFi networks.
We propose a reputation mechanism that encourages the WISPs to behave correctly and to provide all
MN s with a good QoS. We also use a micropayment scheme to make sure that MN s will pay for the
service they received. Our solution leads to a seamless roaming that makes the use of the WiFi network
more attractive to MN s.
By using symmetric key and public key cryptography primitives, we can secure the message exchange
and correctly authenticate the different parties involved in the communication. We minimize however
the use of public key cryptography to reduce the computation cost of our solution.
Our solution thwarts rational attacks, detects malicious attacks and, in some cases, identifies the
attacker while keeping the communication and computation costs very moderate for the mobile node
MN.
As future work, we intend to implement our solution and to verify, by means of simulations, the
efficiency of the reputation mechanism and the robustness of the protocols against various rational and
malicious attacks.
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